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Richard Austen-Baker* 
 
Abstract.  This article interrogates certain presuppositions of consumer law and policy discourse, 
chiefly through the lens of Macneil’s ‘essential contract theory’, in particular his proposed contract 
norms.  Three presuppositions are posited and then discussed in turn.  The author concludes that 
the presuppositions are unjustified and, in so far as they are held in fact, present a risk of distortion 
in debating contract law reform. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The discussion in this article will be structured around a consideration of three 
propositions, made by the author for the purpose and, it is suggested, representing a set of 
fundamental presuppositions underlying attitudes and approaches common amongst 
consumer lobbyists, policymakers and some consumer lawyers.  It should be stressed at 
the outset that the author does not intend to suggest that these propositions are actually 
tenets of these groups, really held in these unvarnished, unqualified and extremely broad 
terms.  Rather, they are suggested as being in some respects akin to, or treated like, 
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Collingwood’s ‘absolute presuppositions’,1  in that the author suggests that these are in 
very blunt terms the taken-for-granted premises underlying some of the assumptions of 
many of those professionally involved in consumer debates. The propositions are as 
follows. 
 
1. The consumer – supplier relation is a more or less strict dichotomy. 
 
2. Differences between the positions of suppliers and consumers are to the 
disadvantage of the latter.2 
 
3. The only way to redress these inherent inequities is by legislative 
intervention. 
 
As a statement of assumptions of consumer-welfarist lawyers, lobbyists and 
policymakers, this is, of course, a huge simplification.  The consumer-welfarist tends to 
hold views related to these at greater or lesser degrees of separation, but never quite these 
views in the pure form stated.  For example, it is fair to refer to Professor Geraint 
Howells’ statement that: 
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Early manifestations of consumer law and policy were often based on a rather crude assumption of 
abuse of power by traders…  However, mainstream policy is no longer fixated with the idea of a 
malevolent trader trying to con consumers…3 
  
It is submitted, however, that this is, in a broad sense, a reasonably fair characterization 
of underlying assumptions, and a useful starting point for discussion.  And one might 
note the following statements in a book jointly authored by Professor Howells: 
 
[T]he consumer [is] typically regarded as under informed and in a weaker position than the 
supplier.  It seems that inequality of economic power between consumer and supplier is the key to 
scepticism about the modern unregulated market as an adequate defender of the consumer interest 
… It is, after all, an inequality which seems endemic to modern society.4 
 
This is suggestive that there is some justification for believing that the second proposition 
above is one that is generally adhered to.  Professors Howells and Weatherill go on to say 
that ‘[t]he shaping of consumer policy depends on pinning down the specific 
consequences of that inequality which are susceptible to legal control’.5  This raises two 
issues: first, that in formulating consumer policy, one must take a realistic view of what is 
and is not so susceptible; but also, second, that legal control is, or ought to be, the default 
position, wherever it can be applied. 
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One might also note the European Commission’s approach.  The preamble to the 
European Directive on Liability for Defective Products6 states that ‘liability without fault 
on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the problem … of a 
fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production’.7  This 
envisages allocation of risks between suppliers and consumers by way of regulation 
rather than by agreement or market forces.  Again, it is possible to discern from this the 
view that consumers are necessarily disadvantaged in relation to suppliers and, more 
particularly, that regulation (in this case, abandoning the law’s existing fault-based rules 
in favour of a no-fault system of compensation) is the only approach to this ‘problem’. 
 
It is a little more difficult to find specific examples clearly pointing to the holding of the 
first of the three propositions.  It is submitted, however, that this supposition is embedded 
in consumer-welfarist thinking.  To some extent, the recognition of such a dichotomy is 
necessary: we cannot talk about consumers without differentiating them from suppliers; 
the two are, in their respective rôles, players on opposite sides.  Nonetheless, if we fail to 
perceive that ‘consumer’ and ‘supplier’ are different rôles, rather than competing species, 
we risk failing to understand fully the nature of the social and economic matrix in which 
consumer-supplier transactions are situated. 
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This article will make particular use, in examining the issues it addresses, of Macneil’s 
essential contract theory, a brief description of which is included below to assist the 
reader in locating the parameters of the discussion.  Before proceeding to this description 
and thence to the main part of the discussion in this article, it might be useful to consider 
the nature of the consumer whose contractual relations with businesses is being 
considered.8  The consumer envisaged in this article can be any kind of consumer, 
ranging from the billionaire buying a superyacht, through the professional person, the 
middle-income, middlingly educated person, and on to poorer consumers in general and 
‘poor and ignorant persons’ as the law used habitually to describe some of the 
particularly vulnerable in our society.  This article focuses its discussion around the 
generality of consumers, rather than any particular category of consumer.9  
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Essential Contract Theory 
 
Essential contract theory is the name given by Professor Ian R. Macneil to his particular 
version of relational contract theory.10  It would be quite impossible here to set out a fair 
account of a sophisticated theory, developed in an extensive literature.  Readers will no 
doubt be aware that relationalism generally is built upon the idea that contracts are not 
discrete events but are more or less complex relations, both inter partes and between 
those parties and a broader network – corporations, commercial groupings, social groups, 
employees and so on, which must be comprehended in order fully to understand what is 
happening in any given contractual situation.11  For some purposes, one can treat the 
contract practically discretely, for other purposes one needs to look at a slightly broader 
but relatively immediate context, for other purposes again, one might need to look at a 
contract in its broad societal setting :  all will depend on the particular contract and the 
purpose for which one is examining it.12 
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Macneil’s essential contract theory posits a number of contractual norms, which provide 
potentially valuable tools of analysis when examining not only individual contractual 
relations, but also contracting generally or specific types of contractual activity,13 with 
the aim of furnishing the scholar with a more complex and multi-layered system of 
classification than is, arguably, provided by other approaches.14  The norms that are held 
to be common to all contracts are :  rôle integrity15 ; reciprocity16 ; implementation of 
planning17 ; effectuation of consent18 ; flexibility19 ; contractual solidarity20 ; the ‘linking 
norms’21 ; creation and restraint of power22 ; propriety of means23 ; and harmonization 
with the social matrix.24  In this article, a number of these norms will be referred to in 
discussing the questions of whether there is such a stark dichotomy between suppliers 
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and producers as appears to be assumed, whether the consumer is always at a 
disadvantage, and whether legal regulation is really so necessary for the protection of 
consumer interests.  Other ideas drawn from essential contract theory and its literature 
will also play a rôle in the discussion. 
 
 
THE SUPPLIER – CONSUMER DICHOTOMY 
 
The first of the propositions formulated for the purpose of discussion here, is that of the 
more or less strict dichotomy or opposition between supplier and consumer.  Of course, 
for some purposes, we must consider them as discrete from one another25 ; for instance so 
that we can analyse a situation arising from a consumer contract :  the parties have rôles 
to play as parties to the contract :  seller on one side, buyer on the other ; contractor in the 
course of business on one side, party contracting as a consumer on the other.26  It will be 
argued here, however, that to do so for all purposes is to mislead ourselves. 
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Agents Without Principals 
 
In Chapter 3 of his New Social Contract,27 Macneil canvasses the argument that we now 
live in a world of agents, but no principals.28  Briefly, the point is as follows.  We 
contract today primarily with corporations.  We deal with shop assistants, account 
managers, branch managers, directors, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Chairman, 
but clearly cannot deal in person with the corporation, as it has no ears, eyes or mouth, no 
senses, no brain, no body.  The corporation cannot, except by its agents,29 make a 
representation, enter into negotiations, orally agree a contract or sign on the dotted line. 
 
The consumer is only likely to deal with quite junior people within the corporation.  
These employees answer upwards, but only to other agents.  The top management of the 
company are also agents with no real principals.  The shareholders ultimately own the 
company (though are not as such the company), but most of the major shareholders are 
likely to be funds run by people who are themselves agents of others and so on.  In any 
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event, shareholders typically only get involved once a year, at the AGM.30  The 
shareholders, in short, are much too diffuse and remote a body to operate as principals, in 
any real sense, to the directors and other employees of the company. 
 
The modern CEO of a large company has constituencies rather than principals.  These 
constituencies include larger shareholders, the shareholders generally at the AGM (but 
only once a year), government, employees, unions, lobbying groups (whether consumer 
groups, environmentalists, anti-tobacco campaigners, animal-rights terrorists, or any 
number of other groups), trades unions, customers, regulatory bodies, potential 
employees, pensioners, the pension fund :  the list can go on and on.  Lower down the 
pecking order, other employees also have constituencies :  the customer services clerk in 
the call centre has his supervisor, his manager, the higher management of the company, 
colleagues, the union of which he is a member (if any) and, of course, the customers to 
whom he spends most of his day speaking and writing. 
 
Consumers may deal with small, owner-controlled, businesses, whether sole-traders, 
small partnerships, or shareholder-managed companies, but this category is relatively 
unimportant in terms of their share of consumer spending.  Consumers may also deal 
with private individuals as suppliers, but this category of transaction is not, generally 
speaking, one with which consumer lawyers and policymakers are professionally 
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concerned.  The real area of concern is the bulk of consumer dealing, which is directly 
with large retailers, and indirectly with, generally, large or large-ish manufacturers.  They 
are thus dealing very much with agents, generally at the most modest levels :  the shop 
assistant, branch manager or customer services person. 31 
 
The importance of understanding that these people with whom the consumer deals are but 
agents is that an agent is distinct from the principal.  An agent has interests which may 
not completely coincide with those of the principal.  Thus, even a top manager may act, 
wholly or partly, on the basis of concerns that are not directly those of the shareholders or 
of an individualist utility-maximizing corporation. The significance of all these agents 
being effectively agents-without-principals, is that there is even less a clear principal’s 
interest to be served, and no one but these agents to serve it. 
 
Thus we see that the notion of a supplier-consumer dichotomy or opposition is in some 
senses and to some extent a problematic one.  The supplier can operate only through 
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human agents (from the CEO down), who do not, and cannot, solely serve an abstract and 
pure supplier interest. 
 
The Human Factor 
 
Another challenge to the notion of the supplier-consumer dichotomy is the human factor 
on the supplier side.  It is important to bear in mind (though it is easily forgotten) that 
staff of suppliers must also be themselves consumers, and can therefore sympathize (or at 
the least, empathize) with legitimate consumer concerns expressed to them.  Macneil 
stresses the human factor in contracting, emphasizing the complexity of rôles many 
workers occupy :  ‘…the checkout clerk in the supermarket, with one of the most 
mechanical jobs in retailing, [also] performs an important public relations function’.32  
The closer the employee is to the customer interface, the more the relationship between 
consumer and the employee tends to the ‘whole person’ end of the spectrum,33 i.e., the 
more the personality of the employee is engaged, and the more open the employee will be 
to influences beyond organizational control from on high.  It takes little empathetic 
ability on our part to imagine that a customer service clerk might worry less about senior 
management directives in favour of an overall toughening-up of refund or repair policy 
than about the specific cases brought to him eight hours a day by irate customers. 
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An illustration of the effects of both the human factor and the agency factor, and the 
difficulties for senior management in imposing their decisions at all levels in the 
organization can be found in the following newspaper story of an attempt to get central 
heating repaired. 
 
The other day, our boiler broke down.  Despite paying £16.47 a month for boiler repair cover, I 
was told by the gas company that the soonest an engineer would be able to call was in four days’ 
time.  Cue grumpy customer outburst from self, at the end of which the woman at the other end 
inquired, in a voice heavy with significance:  ‘Are you elderly, sir?’ 
Like a fool, I took this as a slur on my mental capacities, and launched into another tirade 
about how age shouldn’t make a jot of difference to the quality of service offered.  But the woman 
was clearly trained in the arts of customer placation, and she asked again, in a voice that carried an 
almost audible wink-and-nudge:  ‘Is there perhaps someone in the house who is elderly?’ 
All at once, the penny dropped.  ‘My, er, mother-in-law is 85,’ I replied, with a bit of a 
hopeful question mark at the end of the sentence. 
‘I see,’ the gas lady continued, in the tone of an air traffic controller talking a novice pilot 
down. ‘And-might-she-perhaps-be-coming-to-stay-at-your-house-where-the-low-temperature-
would-render-her-an-elderly-person-at-risk?’  ‘She might indeed,’ I responded, now playing along 
with the game.  ‘In fact, that’s the doorbell now’. 
The operator-assisted deception worked perfectly.  Three hours later, a man in blue 
overalls had come…34 
 
Thus, dichotomy arguments that fail to take full account of the human factor are, it is 
submitted, likely to be flawed.  Ignoring the reality of agents-without-principals, coupled 
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with this human factor could well lead to misleading conclusions.35  The absolute view of 
consumer-supplier dichotomy is, it is argued, in significant ways, unrealistic and provides 
an insecure foundation for a superstructure of consumer (legal) policy. 
 
 
CONSUMER DISADVANTAGE 
 
It would be impracticable within the scope of an article like this fully to canvass the 
extent to which it may be said that consumers are always disadvantaged by any inequality 
in relative positions of consumers and suppliers.  Clearly, it is not necessarily so ; but the 
level at which disadvantage might occur may differ considerably from one instance to 
another.  In some cases, we may point to what we might call ‘high level’ correctives of 
consumer-supplier difference, that is to say market-level factors.  In other cases, the 
factors may be quite specific to the type of consumer and type of supplier, or even to 
individual players. 
 
High-Level Factors 
 
It is often asserted by academic lawyers that consumers are not term-sensitive 
(distinguishing price from other terms).  In other words, consumers might well 
differentiate between different suppliers on price grounds, but are unlikely to differentiate 
on the basis of other terms in the contract of sale.  This is supposed to be the case in part 
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because consumers simply do not have the time, even when they have the sophistication, 
to compare competing sets of terms, and in part because sets of terms tend to be 
standardized across the sector, meaning that there are not even ‘competing’ sets of terms 
as such for the consumer to choose between even if he has the sophistication and the time 
to research the possibilities. 
 
There is considerable force in this argument, but it is too simplistic.  Of what terms are 
we speaking?  Consumers certainly distinguish terms as to quality, sometimes 
consciously, sometimes less consciously.  A very conscious decision as to quality terms 
is the effect of the offer of certain warranties.  Mercedes-Benz seems to be counting on 
this by offering 30-year warranties on its new cars.  This appears to be in response to 
buyer concerns about perceived falls in manufacturing quality following a decision by the 
company that it was ‘over-engineering’ its cars.  Mercedes cars fell from top place in the 
American J.D. Power survey of motor-car buyers’ satisfaction, to a position near the 
bottom of the table.  Offering a long warranty is in part a marketing device :  the 
consumer is expected to conclude that if such a long warranty is offered, there cannot be 
much of a quality problem after all, or, if there is one, it will not really matter since the 
warranty will cover repairs.  But it is also a matter of selecting terms :  no other 
manufacturer offers this extent of warranty protection, so customers (particularly the 
buyers of used cars, to whom the buyers from new will usually in due course sell their 
car) may feel more comfortable knowing that anything expensive likely to happen to the 
car will be fully covered if they maintain this warranty, making the purchase a safer one, 
for which it is worth paying.  At a less conscious level (in the sense of being conscious 
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that we are thinking of contractual terms – a warranty is obviously such a term), there is 
the matter of the overall brand positioning as to quality and price.  A consumer typically 
will assume that expensive goods from a ‘premium’ manufacturer will provide better 
performance and be more durable than a cheaper alternative.  This expectation is to some 
extent, and in some places reflected in the law :  in the United Kingdom, section 14 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 requires the court to consider price in assessing whether the 
goods are of ‘satisfactory quality’ for the purposes of the term implied by that section 
into all contracts for the sale of goods to consumers.36  Thus, merely in the selection of 
the goods to be the subject matter of the sale contract, consumers can be found to be 
term-sensitive as well as price-sensitive, and will, if they are in a financial position to 
make the choice, often trade price for terms, at least so far as major terms are concerned. 
 
Consumers may also choose between retailers on grounds of terms.  It is not necessary to 
have sight of standard terms of sale (even where these exist – which they generally do not 
within the retail sphere37) for consumers either to be aware of particular terms applicable 
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with specific retailers or else for them to have expectations that any problem arising after 
purchase will be dealt with in a given way. 
 
An example of the first is that of the well-known retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S).  It 
made clear a special policy on return of goods :  in addition to consumers’ ordinary rights 
in respect of defective goods, M&S promised to give refunds (or exchanges for other 
goods) for non-faulty goods returned within a reasonable time, without question as to the 
reason, provided a receipt could be produced, or, if a receipt could not be produced, to 
credit the price against the price of other goods to be purchased.  Consumers knew this 
and it provided a significant reason to shop at M&S, especially for gifts, since the 
recipient, if the gift did not fit, or did not suit, could go to any branch of M&S and 
exchange it for something more to their liking.38 
 
An example of the second is the different expectations a consumer has of the treatment 
they are likely to receive from, say, a local market trader on the one hand and Harrods on 
the other.  From the former, the consumer is likely to expect nothing more than his strict 
statutory rights, if that (actualizing those rights with such a trader presents a plethora of 
potential difficulties and may in many cases prove impossible).  From Harrods, the 
consumer expects highly advantageous treatment, and is likely to receive it. 
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 Marks & Spencer were not the only example, and now the practice has become fairly standard amongst 
multiple retailers in Britain, in the fashion sector at least. 
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Lower-Level Market Factors 
 
There may, of course, be a variety of special cases in which the relative position between 
supplier and consumer is likely to be significantly different to the situation in the broad 
market-place for manufactures or services.  The individual shopping in, say, Tesco, is one 
small player dealing with a very large player on the supplier side.  The one small player 
cannot be safely ignored in all instances, because if there are enough instances of poor 
treatment of the small players, then the supplier’s reputation in the market is likely to 
suffer, so that they slip further down the scale which has, say, Harrods at one end and a 
dubious market trader at the other, with implications for market share, price, turnover and 
profits.  But certainly the odd consumer is not in an individually strong position. 
 
Such is not always the case, however.  It is easy to understand that a supplier of luxury 
yachts, for instance, is in a relatively weak position compared with the wealthy consumer 
of its products.  The market is a small one and each sale is very valuable.  The loss of one 
customer (let alone others whom he might know and steer away from this supplier) might 
be critical to the supplier’s survival in business.  Thus, it is no small thing to have a buyer 
go elsewhere if they do not like your terms, and so the individual consumer here can to a 
significant extent ‘call the shots’ within a considerable range of supplier elasicity not 
only as to price but also as to a variety of other terms.   
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Even below such exalted peaks of business as luxury yacht supply, consumers are often 
in a strong position to negotiate terms where high-value goods are the subject matter.  
And it is in the area of high value goods that express terms are more prominent – a 
written contract for sale, with extensive specification, is quite likely in this sector of the 
market, in the same way that such a contract is very unlikely in ‘ordinary’ retailing.  
Buyers of new cars, for instance, are often able to take advantage of substantial room for 
negotiation.  If a particular car dealer will not ‘bite’ then another dealer in the same 
marque might, or one might choose to buy a different but similar marque (the differences 
between, say, an Audi A8, a BMW 7-Series, a Jaguar XJ, a Lexus LS or a Mercedes S-
Class may not be sufficient to rule out fairly ready substitution between them).  Overall 
price may be the main point, or inclusion within the price of a particular optional extra, 
delivery time, or additional (dealer-financed) warranty period.  Whatever the desiderata, 
the mere fact that a consumer is unlikely to get a Mercedes S500 with full options list and 
a 100-year manufacturer’s warranty all for £50 does not mean that the consumer has no 
bargaining power over terms, of which price is only one.39  The value of each sale means 
that its importance to the seller is considerably increased and the risks of losing the sale 
to another dealer or marque become more intense in their effect.40  That the salesman also 
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 The more detailed conditions in a standard form contract – ‘the small print’ – are less likely to be 
negotiable, of course. 
40
 It should not be forgotten, however, that even the grocery customer at a supermarket might well be 
spending over £5,000 a year in that shop – equivalent to a motor customer who buys a new £15,000 car 
every two or three years (allow the profits on servicing during the warranty period and the period shortens 
or the value increases).  Even the humble grocery customer, then, is not such an insignificant player when 
she might take her business to a competitor. 
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earns commission on every sale may also lead to increased willingness to barter over 
terms with an individual customer.  After all, sticking over a £1,000 price difference 
might be fine for the dealership as a whole, which might then sell the car for a better 
price, but for the individual salesman his whole commission may be lost.  They may be 
tough, multi-shot, experienced bargainers, and thus by no means a ‘push-over’, but they 
are still flexible to an extent (again, partly because they are agents with their own 
interests to take care of).41  The fact that the supplier here will have a sticking point and 
will, and need, not be endlessly flexible, and thus has some bargaining power, does not 
mean that the consumer therefore has no bargaining power. 
 
Indeed, it is a necessary feature of contracting that the parties operate from consistently 
different perspectives; which is to say that they play different rôles in the relationship, 
and they need to be consistent in these both as to behaving consistently with the rôle and 
as to maintaining the rôle over time.42  Difference is inherent in, and a necessary norm of, 
contracting43 ; it by no means necessarily implies manifest disadvantage to one type of 
contracting party in all cases. 
                                                 
41
 Albeit that they inevitably operate within certain parameters, whereof some will be more flexible than 
others. 
42
 New Social Contract, p.41. 
43
 See generally, New Social Contract. 
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The Significance of Reciprocity 
 
A problematic factor for the consumer-welfarist propositions is the necessity for 
reciprocity in contract if contractual relations are to exist at all.  In explaining his norm of 
reciprocity, Macneil says of this norm that ‘[t]he norm of mutuality44 calls not for 
equality … but for some kind of evenness’.45  He went on to explain that ‘… simply 
stated [it is] the principle of getting something back for something given’.46  It is not 
likely that Macneil has in mind the purely formal reciprocity of the peppercorn rent, for 
example, but rather something real and valuable (or at least, valued by the recipient).47  
Some aspect of reciprocity has always been needed, so far as we know.  In early societies 
it must have been inherent in specialization, or why would agriculturalists share their 
produce with the village potter, or the potter supply his wares to the hunters?  Reciprocity 
has also formed part of purely formal exchange situations, such as the kula of the 
Trobriand islanders, where there is no bargaining over value, but an appropriate 
reciprocity is an essential element in completing the ritual and paving the way to real 
trading.48 
                                                 
44
 Later renamed ‘reciprocity’. 
45
 New Social Contract, p.44. 
46
 Macneil, I.R., ‘Contracting Worlds and Essential Contract Theory’ (2000) 9 Social & Legal Studies 431, 
p.432. 
47
 Op. cit., above n.24, at p.130. 
48
 See Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific: an account of native enterprise and adventure in 
the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1922. 
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Without reciprocity in contracts, contracts would not be made.  What interest would there 
be in contracting if nothing was to be gained from it?  Would there not be social effects 
and correctives in the widespread absence of sufficient reciprocity?  British observers 
will be familiar with the origins of the British co-operative movement :  (small) retailers 
(long before the days of the big supermarkets and other multiples) were seen to be 
dealing unfairly with poor consumers, quality was not seen to correspond to price and 
sharp practices were rife (such as adding sand to sugar to increase its weight and cheat 
the purchaser).  The result was the setting up first (1844)49 in the northern industrial town 
of Rochdale, and rapidly elsewhere, of co-operative shops, with profits distributed 
between staff and customer-members, and sharp practices banished.50  The movement 
became huge (as did credit unions and mutual building societies and the like) and 
undoubtedly affected business practices across the retail sector.51  Any general failure in 
reciprocity will inevitably result in some sort of reaction.  A single business must also 
look to its customer base if it is not to fail by offering insufficient reciprocation, 
                                                 
49
 There were even earlier co-operative movements of producers; for instance, the Fenwick weavers co-
operative in 1769. 
50
 See generally, Bonner, A., The History, Principles & Organization of the British Co-Operative 
Movement, Co-Operative Union, 1961. 
51
 Indeed, Britain has in the past 15-20 years seen a considerable shrinkage of the mutual sector, both 
because they were no longer perceived as offering significantly better deals than corporate competitors and 
because members themselves preferred to switch to a joint-stock structure. 
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particularly if better reciprocation is offered by its competitors.52  This need for 
reciprocity, as a condition of contracting occurring at all, represents a powerful force in 
securing some ‘even-ness’ or ‘fairness’ in consumer contracting, thus minimizing the 
likelihood of inbuilt consumer disadvantage. 
 
Solidarity 
 
Macneil’s norm of contractual solidarity also plays a part, especially in longer term 
contractual relations.53  Put simply, this means that the parties will tend to try to hold a 
contractual relation together.  This probably has rather more significance in other types of 
contract ; business-to-business contracting, for instance, or employment contracts.  An 
investment is made in some types of contract which cannot effectively and efficiently be 
realized if the contractual relation breaks down.  This is applicable to consumers, since 
they, too, enter into longer term relations, for instance with their gas or electricity 
supplier, their telephone service, their Internet Service Provider, or their cable television 
company.  What is anticipated in each of these cases is a long-term relationship. 
                                                 
52
 Some, of course, provide appalling service and evince a total contempt for their customers :  public 
statements by Michael O’Leary, CEO of Ryanair, are an instance of this.  Ryanair survives and prospers, 
though, because it still offers a sufficient reciprocity – enough customers do actually get on a flight going 
somewhere near where they want to go, and do get there within, to them, acceptable bounds of promptness, 
and this is sufficient reciprocation for a ticket costing often a small fraction of the price of a ticket with a 
‘flag’ carrier.  If the fares were much higher, however, and Ryanair’s reciprocation did not correspondingly 
improve, people would be less willing to contract with it. 
53
 New Social Contract, above n.25, p.52ff, and generally. 
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Companies typically seek growth, but many markets will not see significant overall 
growth (there are only so many completely new households created in a year, and so only 
a relatively slow growth in the number of possible brand new customers (i.e. not 
customers attracted away from competitors) available for, say, gas and electricity in a 
year.  Growth for a supplier in this position must, then, come either from gaining 
customers from competitors (but this is a game for two or more players) or else from 
growing the relationships it has with existing customers.  If growth is to be achieved from 
existing customers, e.g., by selling them extra movie channels on a cable television 
service, or insurance for central heating boilers, a supplier must keep the relationship 
going in the first place.  An approach to such contractual relations which seeks to 
minimize reciprocity by exploiting the consumer’s supposed weaker bargaining position, 
or through sharp practice, is unlikely to lead to high levels of customer retention, or in the 
language of essential contract theory, is behaviour which goes against the norm of 
contractual solidarity. 
 
In any event, the cost of acquiring customers will, in many cases, not be fully offset until 
they have been a customer for some time.  Again, contractual solidarity is essential :  the 
parties need to want to keep the relationship going, including through any trouble.  
Exploitative practices or an unwillingness to negotiate through trouble in good faith is 
likely to lead to a breakdown in contractual solidarity and thus of the contract itself.  
Without the contract, the business makes no money from the consumer, but the consumer 
in a reasonably competitive market will be able to secure the services or goods elsewhere.  
 25 
This being the case, we can see that the supplier is often in the weaker bargaining 
position, because of its own business imperatives towards contractual stability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We can see, even from this very brief and necessarily rather superficial examination, that 
suppliers are by no means necessarily in a stronger position than consumers.  A variety of 
market factors are likely to influence the relative positions of suppliers and consumers, 
with some consumers being in a very strong position indeed (e.g., as with buyers of 
yachts or motor cars).  Macneil has made clear that contracts simply will not be 
sustainable (or in many cases, take come into being at all) without, inter alia, reciprocity 
and contractual solidarity.  These norms are just as operative on the supplier side as on 
the consumer side.  In a sense, they are more operative on suppliers, since consumers 
contract to live, but do not live to contract, while the whole point of a business is to make 
and maintain contracts in order to generate its turnover and (hopefully) profits. 
 
REGULATING DISADVANTAGE AWAY 
 
The third of our propositions is that the only way to redress consumer disadvantage is 
legal regulation :  in effect, legislating it out of existence.  In this section it will be argued 
that this is simply not the case.  This matter will be addressed relatively briefly, however, 
since many of the arguments will already be apparent from the foregoing sections of this 
article. 
 26 
 
The arguments already advanced against the supposition that consumers are necessarily 
at a disadvantage compared with suppliers also apply to the question of whether 
regulation is the only way to correct any inequalities that do exist.  For the same reason 
that consumers are not always disadvantaged, much disadvantage can be eliminated by 
the normal operation of the markets, or by the operation of the common contract norms, 
depending partly on one’s preferred phraseology.  That is to say, consumers will tend not 
to contract to their manifest disadvantage provided that there are accessible alternatives to 
the contract in question.  Regulation, it is submitted, is not only not the only way to 
correct any inequities in consumer-supplier relations, but in some cases may be at best 
irrelevant and at worst counterproductive.  This question is strictly beyond the scope of 
this article :  the author has set out to argue that the posited assumptions which, it is 
suggested, represent a distillation of attitudes common amongst consumer lobbyists and 
also some consumer lawyers, at least, are unjustified, and to seek a partial explanation of 
why this is so.  This article will not, therefore, enter in any detail into this question of the 
efficiency of regulation, but will touch upon it in the conclusions, since the question 
arises naturally from what is here being argued and ought not, therefore, to be completely 
neglected. 
 
There is, however, one last point to be made in relation to the point strictly under 
discussion here.  We have seen that there are good reasons preventing undue inequality 
arising in many cases, as we have seen from our consideration of the consumer-welfarist 
propositions so far.  These are essentially market factors, when viewed from the 
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economist’s perspective, or Macneilist contract norms when viewed from the standpoint 
of legal theory.  Another norm drawn from essential contract theory is that of ‘propriety 
of means’.  In a sense this norm chimes more particularly with the question of regulation, 
as it has less to do with terms as such, still less with price ; it is, in other words, not really 
concerned with the content of the bargain (though it might be regarded as having some 
connexion with reciprocity in that everything passing from one side to another of the 
bargain can be characterized as part of the reciprocation provided by that party).  It is a 
distinct concept, therefore, from reciprocity as such. 
 
This is the norm of conducting oneself and achieving one’s ends by means accepted as 
proper by the parties, and generally by society at large.  (The question of the acceptability 
of contract in substance, as well as in terms of means, also falls within the norm of 
‘harmonization with the social matrix’.)  In his article ‘Contracting Worlds and Essential 
Contract Theory’,54 Macneil gives the following brief description of the norm:   
 
‘[P]ropriety of means: the ways relations are carried on as distinct from more substantive matters, 
including not merely formal and informal procedures, but such things as customary behaviour, 
often of the most subtle kind’.55 
 
This author has argued elsewhere that the English law of contract has quite well-
developed doctrinal machinery for enforcing the propriety of means adopted by parties 
who come before the courts, with some influence on contracting parties generally, insofar 
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 (2000) 9 Social & Legal Studies 431. 
55
 Ibid., at p.432. 
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as they bear in mind the litigation content of contracts.56  Macneil’s point, though, and the 
point here, is that the norm is very largely embedded in contractual behaviour, without 
regard to litigation content.  Long before the courts involved themselves in the 
enforcement of private contracts, let alone had developed a sophisticated jurisprudence of 
private simple contracts, parties nonetheless contracted with one another.57  Essential 
contract theory holds that where one of the norms, in this case propriety of means, is 
deviated from to a significant degree, contractual relations will not hold together.  From 
the supplier’s point of view, vis-á-vis a consumer customer, this generally means that the 
customer will either terminate an ongoing contractual relationship (e.g. by switching to 
another utility supplier), or terminate relations expected to be ongoing by repetition (shop 
at a different supermarket), or, in exceptional cases, particularly if the goods are of high 
value, like a motor car, turn to litigation.  All of these options are ones which the 
management of the utility maximising corporation (insofar as such a thing truly exists) 
wishes to avoid.  As has been argued above, it is, as a rule, more necessary to the interests 
of the supplier than to those of the consumer that contractual relations are maintained.  
Therefore, suppliers are not in a position to go too far in the direction of impropriety of 
means, even at the subtler levels of customary consumer expectations as to supplier 
behaviour, since this is likely to lead to a breakdown in contractual relations.  Proper 
means really amount to procedural fairness in making and performing the contract, often 
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 ‘A Relational Law of Contract?’ (2004) 20 J.C.L. 125. 
57
 Simpson dates the regular involvement of the royal courts in private covenant cases from some time after 
1200 AD: Simpson, A. W. B., A History of the Common Law of Contract, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1975, 
p.9. 
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the subject matter of proposed regulation.58  This notion also sounds in good faith, 
whether in making or performing contracts, though it is not always easy to tell the 
difference between procedural and substantive fairness in cases where it is alleged that 
good faith is absent.59 
 
In short, the contractual norm of propriety of means, coupled with those of reciprocity 
and contractual solidarity, will tend to perform the rôle some seek to fill through 
regulation.  If this is so, then we can at least say, without making ambitious claims, that 
regulation is certainly not the only way to redress any imbalance between suppliers and 
‘ignorant and helpless’ consumers.60 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The application of essential contract theory to the question of whether our three 
propositions make for a viable, tenable credo, even to a fairly limited extent, tends to 
suggest that they are not ; rather we are led to similar conclusions to those of the free-
market economist. 
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 For a very interesting discussion relating to procedural fairness, see Beale, H., ‘Customers, Chains and 
Networks’ in Willett, C. (Ed.), Aspects of Fairness in Contract, Blackstone Press: London, 1996, pp.137-
159. 
59
 See, e.g., Farnsworth, E. A., ‘Good Faith in Contract Performance’ in Beatson, J. and Friedmann, D., 
Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995. 
60
 Adams, J.N. & Brownsord, R., Understanding Contract Law, 4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell : London, 2004, 
p. 62. 
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First, we can see that the position on the supplier side is so complicated that to think in 
terms of a clear dichotomy between suppliers and consumers is to mislead ourselves.  It is 
an elementary tenet of organizational theory that it is people, not organizations that have 
goals.  As Buchanan and Huczynski explain : 
 
Organizations do not have goals.  Only people have goals.  Collectively, the members of an 
organization may be making biscuits, building houses, curing patients, educating students and so 
on, but individual members pursue a variety of goals of their own.  Senior managers may decide 
on objectives and attempt to get others to agre with them by calling them ‘organizational goals’ ; 
but they are still the goals of the people who determined them in the first place.61 
 
This highlights the multifacetedness of the problem of ‘organizational goals’.  Everyone 
within the organization may be pursuing particular goals of their own which may conflict 
with stated ‘organizational goals’ ; and those ‘organizational goals’ are themselves the 
creation of management, who are not, in themselves, the organization and are, most 
importantly for us, usually distinct from the owners of the organization.  A very large 
proportion of all management study is devoted to the question of how the owners and 
management of an organization can seek to actualize its defined goals in an 
organizational real world of agents, multiple constituencies, and complex and conflicting 
individual goals.  The idea of consumer-supplier dichotomy, and the consequences 
assumed to flow from it, depends on a monolithic view of supplier organizations and the 
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 Buchanan, D.A. and Huczynski, A.A., Organizational Behaviour, Prentice-Hall: London, 1985, p. 6. 
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trust that they can and do operate as unfettered, highly individualistic utility maximisers.  
Such is clearly not the case. 
 
Secondly, we can see that both market factors and contractual norms of reciprocity and 
contractual solidarity tend against significant inbuilt disadvantage for consumers as 
against suppliers.  Some may think consumers are ignorant and helpless, but, whether or 
not that is the case, consumers are cared for to an extent in most contracts because they 
are parties to a contract and thus the beneficiaries of universal norms of contracting and 
this is in addition to special circumstances of relative consumer advantage. 
 
Thirdly, following in part from our second conclusion (inasmuch as a non-existent inbuilt 
disadvantage need not be regulated away), in part from the same considerations of 
reciprocity and solidarity, and in part from a consideration of the effect of the norm of 
propriety of means, we see that regulation is by no means the only way in which any 
consumer disadvantage that might exist in a given situation may be satisfactorily 
redressed, across the market at least. 
 
It also follows from these conclusions that a policy approach based, however 
unconsciously, on these presuppositions is likely to be less than satisfactory.  This would 
be a point of purely theoretical interest (though not less important for that), were it not for 
the fact that a good deal of policy in the field of contracts is being driven to a significant 
extent by an approach that assumes a necessity for prioritizing consumer protection 
through regulation.  The consumer protection article of the European treaties assumes just 
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such a necessity, and even though much regulation is purportedly based on the single 
market article, it nonetheless takes a consumer protectionist approach in line with the 
consumer protection article.  Moreover, the project to produce a common framework of 
reference for a European private law of contract is also influenced, it is submitted, by this 
standpoint (particularly given the involvement of consumer lobby-groups as 
‘stakeholders’).  Furthermore,  the approach taken by the study group in producing a 
common framework, i.e., to draw up a form of draft Contracts Code and associated 
codes, such as Sales, means that consumer-welfarist assumptions favouring heavy 
regulation threaten to have a pervasive influence on what is intended to be, after all, a 
code of contract law, not of consumer protection law per se.62 
 
For instance, in the Sales provisions, Article 1:102 provides as follows: 
 
(1) A contract for the manufacture or production, and sale, of goods is to be considered as a 
contract for the sale of the goods unless the party who orders the goods undertakes to supply a 
substantial part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production. 
(2) In a consumer transaction, any contract for the manufacture or production, and sale, of 
goods is to be considered as a contract for the sale of the goods. 
 
                                                 
62
 The author understands that there is now to be a separate consumer code, which is a potentially positive 
development; but this will not necessarily remove the consumer-welfarist input into the main contracts and 
sales codes, so the danger remains.  Many of the points made in this article would, in any event, also be 
applicable to any proposed consumer code. 
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This is far from unproblematic.  For example, if a consumer were to ask a tailor to make 
him a suit from a bolt of cloth to be provided by the consumer, the whole contract will be 
one of sale.  Any quality requirements will therefore be binding on the tailor as if it was a 
sale of goods, and these would extend to the quality of the cloth.  Would this be fair and 
reasonable?  The agreement, once made, would be binding, even before the tailor had 
seen the cloth.  The consumer would have rights against both the tailor and the supplier 
of the cloth, but the tailor, wholly innocent, would have neither any defence nor any 
action over.63 
 
The point seems an important one.  The purpose of contract law is to supply litigation 
content to contracts.  Thus it needs to be fit for the purposes of those likely to litigate 
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 Admittedly, the Sales provisions as currently drafted do not provide any quality guarantees unless 
actually agreed by the parties.  Article 2:201 provides that goods must be in conformity with the contract in 
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‘unless otherwise agreed’.  Therefore, an agreement to derogate from sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) would not be 
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will have ‘otherwise agreed’.  This may, however, be a drafting error and be subject to correction.  In any 
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obligations on the seller of goods to a consumer, so the non-derogable right to satisfactory quality in 
English law would probably be preserved, and perhaps extended to other Member States. 
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contracts, namely businesses rather than consumers.  Consumers do not, in fact, litigate 
on contracts to any great degree.  In England and Wales, the small claims procedure in 
the county courts is the procedure likely to be used in the vast majority of consumer 
claims (covering, at the date of writing, claims for up to £5,000 that are not personal 
injury claims).  Yet figures for the use of this procedure suggest that only around 1,500 
consumer contract claims, at the most, are litigated in this way each year. This is 
suggestive of two things :  first, that consumers on the whole do not feel that they are 
being particularly badly treated by suppliers and, secondly, that where they do feel this, 
litigation is not a preferred option for consumers.  The risk thus arises that a code will be 
drafted which is distorted by the supposed needs of consumers for protection when the 
case for extensive consumer protection is at best doubtful and consumers are, in any 
event, unlikely to be significant users of the code, since they do not by and large engage 
in contracts litigation.  The drafting is, of course, essentially an academic exercise, but it 
is funded by the European Commission, which may not entirely see it that way, and one 
must therefore face up to the risk that a distorted code, not properly fit for its real purpose 
becomes one day enshrined as the basis for a common European law of contract.  Its 
framers should take care to resist consumer-welfarist pressure in order to avoid such an 
undesirable outcome. 
 
 
